



THE
NECESSITY
Of AUGMENTING of our
LAND-FORCES.



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1864

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THE
NECESSITY
Of AUGMENTING of our
LAND-FORCES,
DURING THE
Present Unsettled State
OF THE
Affairs of *Europe*;
IN REGARD

The Number of Troops now Provided for by Parliament, will not be Sufficient for Garrisons, in Case of any Danger.

Containing likewise,

An Accurate LIST of the *French* FORCES, very fit for every *Briton's* Perusal at this Juncture.

De Imperio, de salute Patriæ, de Universâ Republicâ, PATRES CONSCRIPTI, decernite, Diligenter & fortiter. Cicero.

L O N D O N:

Printed for J. ROBERTS, at the *Oxford-Arms* in *Warwick-Lane.* M.DCC.XXXIV.

[*Price One Shilling.*]

MAY, 28, 1913

**SUBSCRIPTION FOR
ENGLISH HISTORICAL TRACTS**

IN REGARD
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Dilectissimi & fortissimi.
 Reverendissimi PATRES CONSCRIPTI, domini
 De Imperio, de salute Patrie, de Universitate

W. D. O. V.

[Print One Binding]
in Warwick-Lane. M.DCCCXXIV.
Printed for J. Roberts, at the Oxford-Street.



THE
PREFACE.



I *t is one of the principal Maxims in Politicks, as well as in Reason, to choose the safest Part, in all dubious Affairs, in which, according to Tacitus, Inactivity is more pernicious than Temerity.*

HOW melancholly is the State of any Nation, when the Rulers are at a Loss for one salutary Expedient

vi The PREFACE.

pedient to obviate the Difficulties that surround them? If they propose to augment the Army, then it will be objected, That they are forming a Design of governing by a military Force; if they continue in a State of Supineness, then they are in Danger of being devoured by a neighbouring Potentate, who lies in wait for an Opportunity of making the Conutry a Province: So that on whatever Side they turn, nothing appears but Terror and Danger. Dii immortales.

IF any thing is wanting to give us a dismal Prospect of our present Condition, let us only reflect upon the Apprehensions of our only faithful

The P R E F A C E. vii

ful Allies the Hollanders ; for, tho' their State is fenced in with a great Number of Fortresses, and a Neutrality, yet do they still look upon themselves to be insecure against the excessive Power of France, of which we have a lively Idea in the pathetic Speech of the Pensionary to the States General, which ought to rouse all Englishmen out of the Lethargy or pannick Fear that has seized them for many Years ; for if the Hollanders are in Danger under the Security of all the Advantages I have mentioned before, besides an Army of Twenty thousand Men for the Field, it is easy to imagine what Ours must be, since we have not even Troops enough to Garrison our

viii The P R E F A C E.

*our Fortified Places, and Wealthy
Towns and Cities, in Case of an
Invasion; and that few of those
Places are tenable against an Army
of regular Forces.*



T H E



THE
NECESSITY
Of AUGMENTING of our
LAND-FORCES.

HEN we look round
us, and reflect upon
the present angry and
turbulent Disposition
of all the neighbouring Powers;
when we hear of nothing daily but
Invasions, great Armies, formidable
Fleets, Magazines, Stores, and
other Preparations of War; will
not the reasonable Part of the
World be amazed to see Great
B Britain

Britain in a State of Indolence and Supineness, tho' no Country in the World ought to be more vigilant, as she is the Object of Envy to her Neighbours, on the Score of her flourishing Trade, and that there is a Competitor for her Crown, who is always watching for an Opportunity of wresting it from the august Family that is so justly possessed of it.

ALL concur in this ; That we should maintain our Empire on the Sea, strong Summer and Winter Guardships ; that our Magazines ought always to be well supplied ; and our great Ships in such a Condition, that we may, upon the least Alarm, equip large Squadrons. The only Points then, in which our Opinions may vary, are, whether we

we should augment our Land Forces at this dangerous Juncture, since it will be demonstrated, that those now on Foot, will not be sufficient to make a Stand against any Body of Troops that may invade us ; or, whether the Militia is so considerable, that we may confide in their Valour at Home, and in that of our Fleets Abroad.

I SHOULD be very unwilling to suggest any thing that might be injurious to the Honour or Fidelity of our Neighbours ; but the best Guaranty of Peace is, a good Army to support it ; and the surest Way to oblige them to the Performance of their Treaties, is to be always upon our Guard : They will then be faithful to their Engagements, when they see no Opportu-

nity of surprising us, and that Peace does not render us indolent and forgetful of the Art of War, nor is it a Reflection upon any of the neighbouring Powers, to say their Faith is not so absolute a Security, but that we must tempt them to observe their Treaties, by shewing them, that they will be no Gainers by acting a contrary Part.

WHEN I seem to consider the Necessity of augmenting our Land Forces, I am far from entertaining any Thoughts of being an Advocate for a Standing Army ; the Case at present is, Whether that may not be absolutely necessary at this critical Juncture ; besides, as the State of the Publick Affairs is every Year considered in Parliament,

ment, such a Step cannot be attended with the least Danger to the Constitution, since They are the only competent Judges, whether the Forces are to be augmented, or reduced, as was frequently practised in the late Reign, particularly after the Rebellion in 1715, and the Year following, when we were delivered from the Apprehensions of the *Swedish* Invasion.

As for the Reasons which some have alledged for confiding implicitly in the King's Goodness and Discretion with Regard to this nice Affair, I own, they don't seem to be well founded; for we have too much Reason to know, that *Princes are but Men*; so that we make a dangerous Experiment of their Virtue, when we indulge them with

an Excess of Power ; and the Condescension to one King who deserves it, and may manage the People's Favour to their Advantage, will be made an Argument for another King, who has neither Merit nor Capacity, to entitle him to the same Degree of Confidence.

HAD our Neighbours continued in the same peaceable State with which the Christian World has been blessed for twenty Years, a Proposal of this Kind should be rejected by every *true Briton* ; but most of the Princes and States of *Europe* are now either engaged in the present Quarrel between the Houses of *Austria* and *Bourbon*, or preparing to put themselves into a State of Defence, and the most powerful of them all is our next Neighbour,
whose

whose Armies may well strike Terror every where, especially in *Great Britain*; for, by the annex'd List, they consist of no less than two hundred and ninety-three thousand effective Men, besides a new Levy of one hundred thousand, and *England* may appear to be too tempting, if she continues in such an unguarded Condition, that the Success of the Attempt may seem to be not only probable, but even certain. Our Country lies open and exposed on all Sides, full of Plenty, our great Towns and Cities without any Defence, our Rivers fordable, no Passes or Defiles to stop an Enemy that should invade us.

To this some will probably object, that an Army cannot rendez-

vous

vous on the Coast, nor can a Fleet be equipped for landing them, without our Knowledge, considering that such Preparations require Time ; for, in such Cases, say they, our Fleet will cover us, while our Militia may be exercised, and are marching to the Places where the Danger is apprehended.

THIS Plan of Reasoning will, no doubt, seem plausible, and have no small Influence upon those who never examine Things to the Bottom ; but surely we cannot forget, that we had been almost surprized twice in King *William's* Reign ; first from *La Hague*, and afterwards from *Calais* ; and, in the late Queen's Time, did not the *French* Fleet steal out of *Dunkirk*, though ours lay off the Place ; and I am
per-

persuaded it will be acknowledged, that nothing but the contrary Wind, which drove them into *Newport*, prevented them from landing in the *Frith* of *Edinburgh*.

BUT there is a later Instance of the Possibility of invading us, which is still fresh in every one's Memory, that is, the Attempt from *Spain* in 1719, when we had no Intelligence of the Design 'till the Fleet had been a Fortnight at Sea ; and 'tis very certain, that, had the Winds favoured them, they might have been the first Messenger of their own Landing.

IF then we were so near Danger in a Time of War and Jealousy, from a Nation so inconsiderable as *Spain* was at that Time in Naval

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Force,

Force, and that without the least Intimation of the Design, 'till we might have been invaded; how much more practicable is an Attempt of that Kind, in a Time of Peace and Inactivity, for a Nation so contiguous to us as the *French*, and so expeditious in all their Enterprizes?

ABSOLUTE Governments, where every thing depends upon the Will of the Prince, and is carried on with the greatest Secrecy, can concert and execute their Schemes much more effectually than can be imagined by those who live in free States, where there are numerous Factions, and where every one thinks himself intitled to the Privilege of examining every Step of the Administration.

I T

IT may, indeed, be supposed, that we shall have always good Fleets at Sea ; but surely it would be the highest Imprudence to hazard the Preservation of a Country, upon one Point of Security, and even that exposed to Accidents ; for the same Wind that may be favourable to a Fleet and an Army to invade us, must shut in our Ships. This may very naturally be supposed, since it happened, when the late King *William* landed in *England* ; for the Easterly Wind, which was favourable to the *Dutch* Fleet, kept ours in Harbour ; and when they put to Sea, a Storm dispersed them so, that, without being able to come to any Action, they returned to Port ; and would any one hazard the Nation upon

such a Contingency? But I cannot conclude this Topick more properly, than with the Saying of the famous *Du Bart*, who was such a Scourge to our Merchants in King *William's* War. The late *French* King happening to consult him about the Design he had formed of invading *England* in 1692, and seeming to be in some Doubt whether the *Brest* Squadron alone could effect it. *Well*, says *Du Bart*, if your Majesty will furnish me with a sufficient Number of Transport Vessels, I'll hazard my Head, if I do not land your Army in *England* without the Assistance of one Ship of War.

THE last Reserve is the Militia, which consists of brave People, no doubt, and far be it from me to offer any thing that may be derogatory

gatory to their Valour or Zeal ; and if there was no other Enemy but a Militia to oppose, there would be little Room to be under any Anxiety about the Success ; but the Difference between Regular Forces, who are instructed in the Art of War, and the best Corps of Raw and Undisciplin'd Men, is too well known : I am well apprised it will be urged, that our Militia may be so trained and modelled, as to be made more serviceable than they are at present ; but this is a Work of Time, and depends upon so many Particulars, and obnoxious to so many Miscarriages in the Execution, that it must be confessed, a Nation is much exposed, if its Safety is to depend upon such Uncertainties.

SOME

SOME perhaps may object, the *Lacedemonian* and *Roman* Militia, as an Argument in Favour of ours ; but 'tis very irregular to apply the Precedents of one Country to another, except Things are in a like Situation, which seldom occurs ; for, *Nullum simile est idem*. No Nation can have any Room for apprehending any Danger from their Neighbours, when their Affairs are in a State of Equality ; as those of *Rome* and *Sparta* were with Regard to the Powers that were contiguous to them. The *Lacedemonians* brought up their Youth to nothing but War, or to such Exercises as rendered them fit for Fatigue and Hardships : They had neither Arts nor Learning amongst them ; so that their whole Republick was
one

one military Body. The *Romans* pursued pretty near the same Plan of Education, while they were a free People; for no Man could pretend to any civil Employments, without serving a certain Number of Campaigns, and shewing the Wounds he had received in them; so that they were a military Republick, as well as that of *Sparta*; for which Reason, I am persuaded it must be granted, those Precedents do not quadrate with the State of our Affairs.

SOME may say, That our Ancestors not only defended our Country, but rendered it formidable to all our Neighbours, particularly to those of whom we have now Reason to be most apprehensive. This is, indeed, a Topick that

that may furnish Matter enough for popular Eloquence, and may impose upon such as are proud of their Country's Valour, and have read only so much History, as to remember the Names of some Battlès, and the Number of the Slain: But, to set this Difficulty in a clear Light, we must observe, that the contending Parties were upon a Level with Regard to Military Discipline, which was not then known in *Europe*; so that it was not surprizing to see the braver Nation prevail: But it is evident from the first and most authentick Histories of the World, that no Militia were ever equal to regular Forces. *Sparta*, *Athens* and *Thebes*, had the Advantage of one another in their Turns, as their Armies were better trained, or experienced
in

in War. *Cyrus*, by disciplining the *Persians*, conquered the *Babylonians*; and *Alexander* conquered the *Persian* Militia, tho' they were numberless, with a Handful of well-disciplin'd Troops. While the *Romans* were only a Militia, they made War upon their Neighbours with great Success; but when *Hannibal* came against them with Veteran Forces, they were vanquished every where, 'till a long War has taught them military Discipline, and then they not only drove him out of *Italy*, but forced *Carthage* itself to submit to hard Terms.

WHILE strict Discipline was observed in the *Roman* Armies, they were every where victorious; but no sooner did they fall into

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Remiss-

Remissness, and neglected the Art of War, than the *Northern Nations* in *Europe*, and the *Saracens* in the *East*; over-run the whole Empire; and as these slacken'd their Discipline, the *Turks* prevailed; and if they had depended upon their *Timariots*, or Militia, and had neglected their *Fanizaries* and *Spahis*, they would not have been a Terror to Christendom for so many Ages; so true it is that Success attends all Armies, according to their Degrees of Discipline, of which we have a very remarkable Instance in the Time of the late Rebellion; for though the present Lord *Lonsdale*, and Dr. *Nicholson*, then Bishop of *Carlisle*, had assembled the Militia of *Cumberland* and *Westmorland*, consisting of no less than 8000 Men; and that they

had

had been disciplined by proper Officers for some Time before, yet it is very certain, that the first Appearance of the Rebels inspired them with such Terror, that they dispersed in a few Minutes, in spite of all the Intreaties and Menaces of their Commanders. Nor can I pass over in Silence, a remarkable Saying of *Cromwell*, who being informed by a Friend, that there were Nine in Ten against him, in most Countries, *That gives me no Disturbance, says the Usurper, for I'll make the Tenth Man a Soldier, and he shall keep the others in Awe.*

WE must remove another Objection that may be made from the History of Queen *Elizabeth*; for at that Time, say some People,

we had no other Army but our Militia, and they preserved us from the *Spaniards* ; but the Truth is, it was neither the Militia, nor our Fleets, that saved us ; it was to the Winds, and to the unweildy Bulk of the *Spanish* Ships, we were indebted for our Deliverance ; there was, indeed, an extraordinary Concurrence of many Incidents at that Time in our Favour ; but it would certainly be too much Presumption to be so unguarded as we were then, since our Danger is now much nearer, and much greater. A mighty Power, well united, free from Faction, and very formidable in Naval Force, is in View of us. A remarkable Saying of the renowned Sir *Horatio Vere*, is very proper, on this Occasion, to shew the

the Insignificancy of a Militia, when opposed by a regular Army.

N O sooner was the Queen threatened with the *Spanish* Invasion, but she sent to the States of *Holland* for that famous General and his Brother, to command her Army, which seemed to be inspired with Zeal and Courage. The Queen rid thro' all the Ranks to animate the Soldiers, who receiv'd her with Shouts and Acclamations. She asked Sir *Horatio*, What he thought of the Army? He answered, *It was a brave one*; but the Queen observing by his Countenance, that he was in some Anxiety about it, she desired him to explain himself: *I will then, Madam*, replied he, *and tho' I never had the Reputation of a Coward,*
yet

yet I own very frankly, that I am
 so at this Time, and perhaps the
 only one in your Majesty's Army.

* IF it be lawful for one Nation
 to make War upon another, for no
 other Reason than their growing
 more powerful than their Neigh-
 bours, *a fortiori*, they should at
 least put themselves into such a
 State of Defence, as may obviate
 any Attempts that may be made,
 either by Foreign or Domestick
 Enemies; but that can never be
 effected, without a considerable
 military Force; so that the Coun-
 try which is destitute of that Ad-
 vantage, exists merely by the Cour-
 tesy of their formidable Neigh-
 bours, which is indeed our Case at
 present, with Regard to *France*
 and

* Reink. d. l. Numb. 21,

and *Spain*, whose Designs must always center in the same Point as to us, since we are the same People who have given those two Monarchies, in their Turns, the greatest Obstruction in their Progress to universal Empire.

WHOEVER seriously considers the Puissance of those Kingdoms, as well in Armies as in Fleets, Alliances and Commerce, must conclude, that our *Fate hangs by a Thread*, as a certain Prince said formerly of his Crown; and that nothing but a special Providence can be our Safe-guard against the *mighty* Power of the House of *Bourbon*.

BUT the Danger will appear in a better Light by comparing the
Forces

Forces of that House, which consist of no less than four hundred thousand effective Men (including those of *Spain*, consisting of an hundred thousand) with ours, which do not exceed eighteen thousand; in which Number, we must reckon eighteen hundred Invalids, who are fit for no other Service but that of Garrisons: Let us now suppose our whole Army to be distributed in the following Manner, in case of Danger.

For
 a better Light by comparing the
 But the Danger will appear in

For the Safety of the Royal Family, and the Defence of the City, and Tower of London	-	-	4000
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For Tilbury Fort, and the other Forts and Docks on the Thames and Medway	-	-	1000
--	---	---	------

Portsmouth	-	-	2000
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Plimouth	-	-	1000
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Pendennis Castle	-	-	200
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Castle of Chester	-	-	500
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Hull	-	-	1000
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Berwick	-	-	1000
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Castle of Edinburgh	-	-	1000
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Sterling Castle	-	-	1000
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Fort William	-	-	500
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Total	-	-	13200
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I AM well satisfied the Calculation I have made for Garrisons, is too scanty; but we must agree upon some Medium, to gratify those who believe nothing but their Eyes.

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WE

WE must likewise observe, that the Great and Wealthy Cities, and Trading Towns, are no less to be preserved than the fortified Places, since the Possession of them would not only give an Enemy an Opportunity of extending their Conquests, but of being Masters of immense Riches ; such as *Bristol, Exeter, Canterbury, York, Liverpool, Newcastle, Edinburgh, Glasgow, and Inverness* ; so that in lieu of having an Army for the Field, to oppose an Enemy, there are not Troops enough for Garrisons.

○ ○ SOME may object, That in such a Case we should drain the Garrisons, and fight an Enemy upon their first Landing ; it must indeed be acknowledged, that some Princes and Generals have left us Examples of that Kind ; but the Political Writers tell us, it is the highest Imprudence to hazard the Fate of a Kingdom upon the Issue of one Battle,

Battle, which is generally decisive in a Country like ours, where there is so few Places of Strength ; and 'tis well known, that *Harrold's* Rashness lost *England* at *Hastings*, which has left but little Encouragement to his Successors to imitate his Example.

It will, no doubt, be urged, that we have several Alliances with foreign Powers, by which they are engaged to send us Succours in case of Danger. 'Tis true, we have entered into many defensive Treaties with several States and Princes ; but I think the Condition of any Nation must be very unhappy, indeed, when their Preservation is in the Hands of any foreign Powers, though they were willing to comply with their Engagements ; but the Difficulty lies there ; for their own Affairs may possibly be in equal Danger with ours, and consequently cannot fur-

nish us with any Troops, or they may not think it their Interest at that Time, on Account of some Alteration in the State of their Affairs.

BUT let us suppose, for Argument sake, that the States of *Holland* (who are the only Allies we can confide in in case of Danger) should be willing, and in a Capacity of sending us the stipulated Succors, I'll maintain the Kingdom might be over-run, either by a foreign or domestic Enemy, before they could arrive in *England*; such is the dilatory Method of proceeding in that State, owing to their Form of Government.

WE have a memorable Instance of this in the Year 1715; for tho' Mr. *Horatio Walpole* solicited the States in the Beginning of *September*, to have the Succours sent away with the greatest Expedition, yet they did not arrive in the *Thames*
'till

'till the Beginning of *December*. It may perhaps be said, That the contrary Winds kept them on the Coast of *Holland*; I grant it, and that should be a powerful Reason why we should not place our Safety in any thing that depends upon the Weather. I remember very well it was then suggested, that the States were industrious in delaying the March of their Troops to our Assistance, in order to have some Pretence to the Favour of our Rival, in case it should be his Fortune to prevail. Whether that was the real Motive of the Delay, I will not take upon me to determine; but this is very certain, That no People in the World, that understands their own Interests better, or considers the Vicissitude of human Affairs with more Delicacy and Justness, which has preserved them for a whole Century and more, amidst a Number of
powerful

powerful Enemies, who had alternately endeavoured to subvert her Liberties, and considering the present excessive Power of the House of *Bourbon*, I am persuaded few Princes will be very forward to incur their Displeasure, which is the Case of several in *Germany*, especially if that House has the least Shaddow of Right on their Side, and 'tis but too notorious, that the Faith of Treaties has, for above an Age past, been rather an Object of Ridicule than Obligation.

IT will be likewise observed by our Adversaries, that the *Hollanders* have not made any Augmentation to their Forces, tho' they are nearer the Danger than *Great Britain*; but it will be easy to demonstrate, that the Condition of their Affairs and ours, is very different; for they have such a long Chain of strong frontier Towns, as would cut out Work for the most

most formidable Armies for several Campaigns: And yet we may observe, by the Pensionary's Speech, that they look upon themselves to be in great Danger. There is still another Reflection that evidently distinguishes our Circumstances from those of *Holland*: It is but too well known, that there is a Competitor for our Crown, which keeps us always divided, and consequently more exposed to Dangers and Invasions; for how easy is it for *France* to make use of him to tempt us into a Quarrel? Has she ever been at a Loss to find out Expedients for that End?

THERE is another Consideration that will make it absolutely necessary for us to augment our Forces; that is, the Emperor's rejecting the Neutrality which the *Hollanders* have entered into with *France* for the *Austrian Netherlands*; so that we may now expect
the

the War will soon break out in that Country, and is consequently at our Doors.

BUT the powerful Objection (not only against an additional Force, but any Force at all) is, that it will grow upon us, and become, at length, Part of the Constitution: It will, say some People, maintain itself in the House of Commons; or, if that should fail, it will then turn them out of Doors, and establish itself upon the Ruins of Liberty: There are innumerable Instances, no doubt, of the Tyranny of Armies in all Countries; but Times, as well as the different State and Situation of Affairs in every Kingdom must be distinguished, in order to lead us to the Knowledge of those Causes that paved the Way for military Governments; but an Attempt of that Kind is impracticable, if not impossible, in *England*, while the
Payment

Payment of the Army depends upon Parliament, for it can never be supposed by any Man, who is not deprived of his Understanding, that Eight hundred Noblemen and Gentlemen, of whom Seven Parts are Men of Fortune, should concur in any Measures for making themselves Slaves. Indeed, if the Army was to be paid out of the King's Coffers, and that a Parliament did not sit above once or twice in the Space of Ten Years, which was the Case in some former Reigns, then the Nation might have strong Reasons for apprehending a military Government; but nothing can be more chimerical than Jealousies of that Kind, under the present Administration, when a Parliament meets once a Year, which gives them an Opportunity of examining the State of Affairs, as well at home as abroad, but especially since the Subsistence of the Army entirely depends upon the Will and Pleasure of Parliament: But, to sum up this

F whole

whole Argument against Armies, I think nothing so proper to undeceive People of their strange Whimsies on that Head, as to look back upon the Conduct of the last Reign, when it was sometimes thought adviseable to have great Armies on Foot, according to the Exigency of Affairs, yet was there no Attempt, or even the least Shaddow of any Step that could tend towards an Invasion of the Laws, or the Constitution. The same Remark may be made upon the present Reign; so we well may conclude, that whatever has, or can, be offered against supporting, or augmenting a Body of Forces, according to the Vicissitude of Affairs either at home or abroad, can have no other View than to alarm and inflame the Minds of weak or unthinking People.

ON the Whole, a considerable Land Force would not only secure us against real Dangers, but the imaginary ones too, which have frequently alarmed the whole Kingdom, in the
Space

Space of a few Years. In what Confusion were we upon the Noise of the *Spanish* Expedition to *Oran*? Was not the whole Kingdom disorder'd on that Occasion? What pressing of Sailors in our Ports? What Interruption of Trade by taking Men out of the Merchant Ships? What Fall of Stocks? We were in the same Fright the Year before, upon some Advice, that the *French* were marching to *Dunkirk*: And since we must be always exposed to the same Inconveniences and Disorders (which put the Government to incredible Expences, and disturb the Quiet of the whole Kingdom, while our Land Forces are so inconsiderable, as they are at present, which has been the only Source of the outrageous Behaviour of some People at home, and the Affronts and Injuries we have received abroad in our Reputation and Commerce.



*A LIST of the Forces of his Most
Christian Majesty, Nov. 1, 1733.*

	Battall.		Battall.
French Guards	6	Limosin	2
Swiss Guards	4	Royal Vaisseau	2
Picardie	3	Orleans	2
Champagne	3	The Crown	2
Navarre	3	Bretagne	1
Piedmont	3	Perche	1
Normonde	3	Artois	1
La Mariene	3	Louvigni	1
Auvergne	2	Dauroy	1
Bourbonnois	2	La Serre	1
Richelieu	2	La Ferre	1
Tallard	2	Alsace, German	2
Pons	2	Royal Rouffillon	1
The King's	4	Conde	2
Royal	2	Bourbon	2
Poitou	2	Beauvoisis	1
Lionnois	2	Rouvergne	1
Dauphin	2	Bourgogue	1
La Gewaizais	2	Royal Mariene	1
Touraine	2	Vermandois	1
Anjou	2	Saxe, German	1
Du Main	2	Royal, Artillerie	5
D'Estain	2	Royal, Italian	1
Meuse	2	Languedoc	1
La Cheulay	2	Meye, Suisse	2
The Queen's	2	Braudly, Suisse	2
		Bettan	

Bettan, Suisse	2	Quercy	1
Hesly, Suisse	2	Nivernois	1
D'Affrisse, Suisse	2	Bric	1
St. Simon	1	Soissonnois	1
Medoc	1	L'Isle de France	1
Teusac	1	Voxin	1
Tessé	1	Annix	1
Royal Comtois	1	Beauce	1
Montconceil	1	Dauphine	1
Provence	1	Vivarez	1
D'Hemel, Suisse	2	Luxemburg	1
Diespach, Suisse	2	Bassigney	1
Mortemar	1	Beaujolais	1
Mailly	1	Ponthieu	1
Nice	1	La Sufe	1
La Mack, German	1	Courten, Suisse	2
Toulouse	2	Buckley, Irish	1
Guienne	1	Dillon, Irish	1
Lorraine	1	Clare, Irish	1
Flandres	1	Lync, German	1
Berry	1	Montmorency	1
Bearn	1	Piqueny	1
Haynault	1	Estampes	1
Boulonnois	1	Roth, Irish	1
Angoumois	1	Berwick, Irish	1
Perigord	1	Bleffois	1
Xaintogne	1	Galinois	1
Bigow	1	Conti	2
Foret	1	Auxerrois	1
Chamberry	1	Agennois	1
Tournesif	1	Sansterre	1
Foix	1	De Laudes	1
Bresse	1	Auguin	1
La Marke	1	Royal Bavaria	1

N° Battallions 181

D R A.

DRAGOONS.

Coll. General	3	D'Armenonville	3
Metre de Camp.	3	L'Espinay	3
Royal	3	Vitri L'Hospital	3
The Queen	3	D' Harcourt	3
Dauphine	3	Nievlay	3
Orleans	3	Lafuse	3
Conde	3	Languedoc	3
Beaufremont	3		

N^o Squadrons 45

*The KING's Household, as they march
according to their Ranks.*

The First Comp. of the King's Life Guards, called the Scots Company	300	The 9th Comp. call'd the second of the Black Musketeers	250
The 2d Company	300	The 10th Comp. called the Eng. Gens D'Arms	200
The 3d Company	300	The 11th Comp. call'd Bourgoig- nion G.D'Arms	200
The 4th Company	300	The 12th Comp. called the Flan- ders G.D'Arms	200
The 5th Company	200		
The 6th Company	200		
The 7th Comp. called the Scots Gens D'Arms	200		
The 8th Comp. called the first of the Grey Musketeers	250		

The

The 13th C.	called the	{ G. D'Arms	
The 14th C.	Queen's	{ L. Horse	
The 15th C.	called the	{ G. D'Arms	
The 16th C.	Dauphine	{ L. Horse	
The 17th C.	called Labour-	{ G. D'Arms	
The 18th C.	gogne or Bur-	{ L. Horse	1800
	gundy		
The 19th C.	of Anjou	{ G. D'Arms	
The 20th C.		{ L. Horse	
The 21st C.	of Berry	{ G. D'Arms	
The 22d C.		{ L. Horse	
The 23d C.	of Orleans	{ G. D'Arms	
The 24th C.		{ L. Horse	
The Company called the Horse Grenadiers			
which marches on all Occasions, at the			150
Head of the Household			

H O R S E.

Coll. General	3	Dauphin Stranger	3
Metrede Camp Gen.	3	Bretagne	3
Commissary General	3	Anjou	3
Royal	3	Berry	3
The King	3	Orleans	3
Royal Foreigner	3	Conde	3
Royal Cuirassiers	3	Clermont	3
Royal Cravats	3	Bourbon	3
Royal Rouffillon	3	Du Maine	3
Royal Piedmont	3	Toulouse	3
Royal German	4	Conti	3
Royal Carabiniers	10	Villars	3
The Queen	3	Villeroy	3
Dauphin	3	Lambesque	3
		Luin	

Luines	3	De Lorges	3
St. Simon	3	Lenoncourt	3
Gondela	3	Chepy	3
La Tour	3	Briffac	3
Lorrain	3	Levy	3
Cayeux	3	Ruffay	3
Turenne	3	Roseu	3
Vaudray	3	Noialles	3
Montrevel	3	Bethune	3
Brion	3	Fitz-James, Irish	3
Rochefoucault	3	Safeuage	3
King Stanislaus	3	Roye	3
Peyre	3		
La Moth Hodancourt	3	<i>H U S S A R S.</i>	
D'Aumont	3		
Vasse	3	Rattki	1
La Ferronay	3	Berchini	1

Total Squadrons 181

To the above 181 Battalions must be added 195 Battalions of Militia, under the same Discipline, together with 200 Companies of Invalids, and ten Independent Companies, amounting in the Whole to } 253719

The Whole Corps of Dragoons, including 6 Independent Troops, is } 8058

The whole Corps of Horse 26064

The King's Household 5250

Total 293091

New Levies 100000

393091

F I N I S.

